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Introduction
Tax havens have recently been heavily debated in the policy arena for several reasons, ranging from fragile …scal positions of many economies to recent revolutions against many corrupt autocratic o¢ cials who stored their assets in havens. Academically, the role of tax havens in the world economy is largely viewed within the framework of international tax competition. Most studies assume that the real operation of the …rm takes place in a high-tax country, possibly one with an advanced economy. The function of the a¢ liate in the tax haven is to receive (a portion of) the corporate income, which is thus shifted away from the domestic high-tax country for purposes of tax avoidance. 1 In this study, we focus on other roles of tax havens in the world economy. First, we examine theoretically the connection between the operations of …rms in corrupt countries (possibly with low-and middle-income economies) and …rms'demand for tax havens'services.
2 Second, we model the corrupt authority's problem of choosing the optimal bribe rate. Third, we provide new insights into welfare consequences of eliminating tax havens. Fourth, we empirically analyse the link between operating in corrupt countries and the presence of multinational …rms in tax havens, using German …rm-level data.
Firms operating in highly corrupt countries face special circumstances. First, …rms bribe o¢ cials to maintain their investment activities. Second, bribes do not insulate …rms from risks. In the absence of a credible rule of law, contracts are not enforceable. Firms fear expropriation, blackmailing, or a sudden eruption of instability in the corrupt host economy. Hence, even if the corporate income tax rate in a corrupt country is relatively low, multinational a¢ liates have a strong incentive to conceal and shift (a portion of) their income. The question is then: Where to? The origin country is not the most preferred option available for the multinational …rm, especially if the parent …rm is located in a high-tax country. Alternatively, multinational a¢ liates can transfer the income generated in highly corrupt countries to tax 1 Dharmapala (2008) provides a survey. 2 The negative relationship between corruption and GDP per capita is documented in Svensson (2005) , along with other variables related to corruption. 2 havens. 3 Public debates and media reports often assert that not only …rms but also corrupt o¢ cials use tax havens for hiding income. Our theoretical sketch explicitly considers the transfer of bribes to o¤shore tax havens, and allows the probability of revolt against the corrupt authority (eruption of instability) to be a function of the provided amount of public goods. A higher bribe rate increases the extracted rent by o¢ cials, but at the same time it reduces the bribe base, since …rms'demand for tax havens'services increases with higher bribes.
We analyse the welfare implications under various scenarios. The e¤ects of eliminating tax havens on the citizens of the corrupt country can be summarised as follows:
Firms'investment in the corrupt country decreases under standard assumptions on the interest elasticity of capital demand and on the cost of shifting income from the corrupt country to the tax haven. Accordingly, private consumption by the citizens of the corrupt country decreases. Thus, the e¤ect on welfare through …rms'investment is negative.
In a world without tax havens, it is more di¢ cult for corrupt o¢ cials to conceal bribes. As a result, the provision of public goods unambiguously increases in order to lower the probability of revolt and losing o¢ ce. Hence, eliminating tax havens has a positive e¤ect on welfare by precluding their support for corruption.
The overall welfare e¤ect depends on the functional forms and parameters of the model. These new welfare results for a corrupt country complement those in Slemrod and Wilson (2009) , who consider only a non-corrupt country. In our framework, as in theirs, tax havens constitute a drain on revenues of the non-corrupt country. In our setting, the welfare e¤ect of eliminating tax havens'operations on the non-corrupt country is positive provided that factor prices are constant.
Other, related studies point out that tax havens have positive e¤ects on welfare. These are summarised in three e¤ects: (1) Tax havens support an equilibrium where all non-havens set the same (high) tax rate and hence raise revenues (Johannesen; 2010a), (2) borrowing from tax havens increases the e¢ ciency of the …rm and its investment at home (Hong and Smart; , and (3) tax havens with advanced banking sectors (o¤shore …nancial centres) improve competition in the banking sectors in neighbouring countries, generating positive welfare e¤ects (Rose and Spiegel; . However, these studies consider the issue from the standpoint of su¢ ciently advanced economies, whereas our model stresses the importance of viewing the welfare e¤ects of tax havens from a global perspective by incorporating features of less advanced economies. The notion that tax havens are linked to corruption and development has been a concern in many discussions. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign A¤airs published in 2009 a report focusing on tax havens and development. In a chapter of this report, Torvik (2009) emphasises the e¤ects of tax havens on resource-rich countries and gives examples of dictators who shift money from dubious sources to tax havens. Related studies are by Schjelderup (2011) , who argues that tax havens reduce the costs of entering illegal businesses, and Slemrod (2008) , who underlines the status of tax havens as a means of commercialisation of state sovereignty. 4 Empirically, welfare and detailed information on tax evasion and corruptionrelated matters are unobservable. However, we test the hypothesis stemmed from our model positing that the presence of multinational …rms in corrupt countries is positively associated with a high probability of demanding tax havens' operations. Based on conditional …xed-e¤ects logistic regressions and after controlling for …rm size and unobserved heterogeneity at the parent …rm level, we …nd empirical support for this hypothesis. This new result contributes to the existing empirical literature that links …rms'demand for tax havens'a¢ liates to the tax regime of the home country or the size of the …rm (e.g., Desai et al., 2006, and Gumpert et al., 2011) . 5 We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model and the resulting equilibrium equations determining the share of …rms that use tax havens and the optimal bribe rate. In section 3, we provide a welfare analysis of shutting down tax havens. Section 4 generalises the benchmark setup by allowing the probability of revolt against the corrupt government to be endogenous. Section 5 provides empirical results using the German MiDi 4 The increasing academic interest in the tax havens'businesses is re ‡ected in a number of recent contributions focusing on other, related aspects. Examples are Johannesen (2010b), and Ma¢ ni (2009). Hebous (2011) provides a recent survey. Bardhan (1997) surveys the literature on corruption and development. 5 In a distinct but related study, Kesternich and Schnitzer (2010) show that multinational a¢ liates have higher debt levels in environments of high expropriation risks. 4 …rm-level data. Section 6 concludes.
Benchmark Model

The Setup
We build on the model of Slemrod and Wilson (2009) , and extend their setup by including a corrupt country in addition to the non-corrupt country and the tax haven. The timing of events is as follows. First, the non-corrupt country chooses tax rates and tax enforcement, whereas corrupt governments choose the bribe rates, the level of public goods, and the share of rents to shelter in a tax haven. The decisions of the governments are simultaneous. In the second stage, …rms are formed to ensure that the net expected interest rate is the same in each country. In the third stage, taxes and bribes are paid, a share of capital returns is sheltered, and public goods are provided. Finally, in the last stage, expropriation either occurs or does not.
Firms in the Non-Corrupt Country
The problem of the …rms in the non-corrupt country is identical to that in Slemrod and Wilson (2009) . 6 The technology depends on labour L and capital K, and exhibits constant returns to scale. The before-tax return on capital R is given by:
where W (:) denotes the wage as a function of the labour-capital ratio. The non-corrupt country sets a tax rate t on capital. Firms buy services c from the tax haven to conceal a share s n of capital income. 7 The share s n is a concave function of c. The tax haven sets a price p per unit of provided services c. Hence, the variable cost of buying these services is pc.Firms di¤er in the …xed costs of using tax havens as captured by the parameter , which is the rrealisation of a random variable with a continuous distribution function G( ). The reported share of income, (1 s n ), is subject to the tax rate t. After-tax pro…ts with the advantage of income-shifting are:
Correspondingly, the …rst order condition is
The following equality determines the share of …rms that will use the tax shelter: = ts n pc:
Firms in the Corrupt Country
Without loss of generality, we assume that the tax rate in the corrupt country is zero. Further, …rms operating in the corrupt country face a probability of expropriation . The corrupt country sets a bribe per euro of capital earnings, b. The …rm aims to circumvent reporting a portion of its pro…ts in the corrupt country to avoid paying higher bribes. When the …rm shifts pro…ts from the corrupt country to the non-corrupt country, whether by standard methods of pro…t shifting such as transfer pricing or by tax evasion, pro…ts will be subject to the high tax rate of the non-corrupt country. Although bribes enter our model exactly in the same way as taxes in the non-corrupt country do, there is an essential di¤erence between the two. The latter instrument is the product of the rule of law, whereas the former is at the discretion of government o¢ cials. As with any product of discretion, there is no guarantee that paying bribes prevents future extortion. 8 After-tax pro…ts are then
Consequently, the FOC is
Comparing this with the expression for the non-corrupt country ts 0 = p, for b = t, we note that s 0 is smaller in the corrupt country than in the noncorrupt country. Further, because of convex costs, s must be larger in the corrupt country. Thus, the number of …rms that use tax havens is also larger in the corrupt country:
=bs c pc;
whereb is de…ned as:
This can be interpreted as the e¤ective expected bribe rate that re ‡ects both the necessity to bribe and potential extortion. To summarise, we can state that:
Given identical tax rates in the non-corrupt and the corrupt country, a …rm uses tax havens more extensively if it operates in a corrupt country: s c > s n . This is in line with Shleifer and Vishny (1993) , who state that corruption is more distortionary and costly than taxation.
The proportion of income shifted to tax havens increases with an increase in bribes b and the probability of expropriation .
Equilibrium
The corrupt government maximises its rents (bribes net of public goods) subject to an obligation to provide at least a minimal level of public goods (g g 0 ). The corrupt government faces a probability of revolt by its own citizens and hence losing o¢ ce ( ): The government may choose to conceal (a portion of) bribes from its own citizens by channeling them to the tax haven at a cost of g . For the moment, we assume that is exogenous. We will relax this assumption in the next section, and explicitly permit to be a decreasing function of public goods g. The households' budget is the same as in the non-corrupt country (x = r c k + W (R)), where k is the …xed stock of capital owned by the inhabitants of the corrupt country. Taking the expectation of the interest rate across …rms as given by (2), we obtain the last constraint:
where := G(bs c pc): The problem of the government is
and constraint (4) . The government will use tax havens to shift its entire revenues if
Otherwise, the government will not demand havens' services at all. If is exogenous, then the …rst constraint is binding: g = g 0 . In this case, the problem becomes one-dimensional with the necessary optimality condition for an interior solution:
= 0:
we derive the following expression:
Intuitively, the corrupt government bene…ts directly from a higher bribe rate and a higher interest rate, but at the same time it loses the bribe base. The loss of bribe base consists of three parts: (1) the number of …rms using havens'services, sb d db , (2) the amount of service used by each …rm, b ds db , and (3) a potential loss of investment due to a higher interest rate, Rk 0 (R). We …rst consider the corrupt country as having a small open economy that does not a¤ect the net interest rate. 9 The second-order condition is presented in the appendix. 8 
Welfare E¤ects of Eliminating Tax Havens' Services
We analyse two particular cases: First, there is no tax haven. (Technically, tax havens'services are prohibitively costly.) Second, tax havens are pervasive; that is, capital can be shifted to the tax haven with zero …xed cost.
Eliminating Tax Havens
We can model the no-havens situation by shifting the distribution of up to make it prohibitively high. Then, s c = c = = 0, , and net pro…ts take the value
Since government also cannot use havens'services, using the same optimality condition (7) with explicit derivative
Note that if " 1, the government will want to charge the full bribe. Therefore, " has to be larger than 1 (" > 1). The intuition behind this condition is similar to the textbook result in the case of a monopolist that operates only on the elastic segment of the demand function. This requirement is satis…ed, for example, in the case of a Cobb-Douglas function: f = k where is a constant.
Pervasive Tax Havens
If 0, all …rms shift the same amount determined by (3), and = 1. The net pro…t is
wherebybs > pc.
The optimal bribe can be determined as:
and thus it depends on the properties of the function of the cost of avoidance and on the elasticity of capital demand. 10 
Comparison
Let denote the elasticity of capital income with respect to the bribe rate:
and let denote the elasticity of the share of reported income with respect to the bribe rate:
Both and are evaluated atb = 1=": We show in the appendix that bribes are higher in the presence of the tax haven if
We can distinguish between three cases:
The bribe rate decreases in response to the availability of tax havens. Since dR db > 0 for any bribe rate, the investment increases further. Therefore, the investment in the new equilibrium with tax havens will be higher than without tax havens. If the reported income is very sensitive to a change in the bribe rate, introducing the tax haven increases investment and decreases the bribe rate.
Case 2 ( + ) jb =1=" < 1 andb h < b 0 The bribe rate increases. This exerts downward pressure on investment. Moreover, it raises the elasticity + , as otherwise no interior solution is possible. The new equilibrium is then characterised byb h such that ( + ) jb =b h = 1. Let b 0 be the bribe rate that results in no-havens investment level:
r. The investment level in the new equilibrium is 10 The derivation is documented in the appendix. Note that alternatively, we can consider the case when p = 0, > 0. In this case, those …rms with b shift all their income to the tax haven whereas the rest of the …rms do not use the tax haven at all. The results are similar to the case where 0, and are available upon request. 
higher than without havens ifb h < b 0 . When the reported income is not very sensitive to the bribe rate, but if it responds then it will respond su¢ ciently fast, then both the bribe rate and investment rise.
Case 3 ( + ) jb =1=" < 1 andb h > b 0 If the reported income is neither very sensitive to the bribe rate, nor fast in changing, then the bribe rate will rise and investment will fall. The bribe rate increases with an introduction of cheap havens'services. This may not seem intuitive at the …rst sight; why it should be more pro…table to charge higher bribes when it is easier for the …rms to escape these bribes? The reason is that the corrupt government as a …rst mover fully internalises the potential bene…t. However, this requires a special form of avoidance cost function with a very high degree of convexity of the costs of avoidance such that the bribe elasticity decreases with the amount of shifted income. This in turn allows higher monopoly prices -higher bribes. We view this scenario as a merely theoretical possibility, though, and we rule it out in the rest of the paper.
To sum up, table 1 presents the results of these three cases. Finally, note that if + = 1, then bribes and investment remain unchanged if we shut down the tax haven.
We summarise this discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Investment in the corrupt country is higher when all …rms demand tax havens services as compared to the case when no …rm demands tax havens'services.
Proof. The proof of proposition 1 directly follows from the above discussion.
Since investment is mechanically related to the gross interest rate and hence also to the wage, the following corollary is immediate:
Corollary 1 Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, the gross interest rate R (wage W ) in the corrupt country is lower (higher) in the case of pervasive havens than in the case of no tax havens.
Intuitively, the rents of the corrupt government should decrease in the presence of a tax haven because avoidance opportunities for …rms put an additional constraint on the bribes that the government would like to impose.
Proposition 2 In the absence of the threat of revolt, the corrupt government is at least not worse o¤ in a situation without a tax haven than in the situation with a haven.
Proof. See appendix.
There is a caveat in our formulation that may revert the result of Proposition 2. The corrupt government also wants to use tax havens, if > 0. Clearly, for large values of the revolt probability, the gain from not letting the …rms avoid bribes is dwarfed by the danger of losing all the bribe revenue as a result of people's upheaval.
Corollary 2 There exists
> 0 such that the corrupt government prefers no havens for any < and pervasive havens for any > .
Extended Model 4.1 Endogenous Probability of Revolution
Thus far, we have assumed that probability of revolt is exogenously given. However, it is likely that it is a¤ected by the amount of provided public good. 11 In the following we assume that (g) is a decreasing convex function with lim g!1 (g) = 0. We assume that g 0 is low enough not to be binding when havens are not available. Then the part of optimal solution for the problem (5) will be
The use of tax havens is now pro…table as long as (g )b (1 s c ) g , so there will generally be an interior s g such that the pair g ; s g solves the equation above together with
Clearly, this interior solution is only possible, ifb (1 s c ) > g . Otherwise, no tax haven is used by the government.
The E¤ect of Tax Havens'Services
For prohibitively high , (13) can no longer hold, but (12) determines g :
where bribe is determined by (9), i.e., independently of g. Thus, the probability of revolt can be determined from the inverse of the government revenue 1=bRk; the higher the government revenue, the higher the provision of public good.
In the opposite case, when buying concealment services is costless, the government will not provide any public good, and hence the public good constraint is binding. Notice that Proposition 1 still holds in our extended model, because its proof does not rely on any properties of . To sum up, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 It is always more attractive to eliminate tax havens if is endogenous.
Intuitively, the endogenous probability of losing the o¢ ce adds another channel through which tax havens negatively a¤ect the welfare in the corrupt countries. Namely, havens decrease the provision of public good in corrupt countries.
The E¤ects on the Corrupt and Non-Corrupt Countries
The above analysis has focused on the corrupt country. In this subsection, we consider the above-mentioned scenarios with a full setting. The tax haven fully shuts down and is prevented from providing services in either the corrupt or the non-corrupt country. In this extended setup, there is a potential asymmetry in the capital stock of both the non-corrupt and the corrupt country. Despite the fact that the net interest rates are equalised, the gross rates do not have to be equal, because of the di¤erent government objective functions. The market-clearing condition is k (R) + k (R c ) = k .This condition pins down the net interest rate in the world.
We summarise the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The elimination of tax havens increases welfare in the noncorrupt country and decreases it in the corrupted country, if factor prices are una¤ected.
Proof. See appendix. Naturally, this result may be weakened or overturned if the endogenous revolt probability is taken into account. As we can see, Propositions 1 and 4 isolate di¤erent channels through which tax havens may a¤ect welfare in the corrupt countries. Proposition 1 describes a change in welfare due to the change in investment and hence wage income of the people. Proposition 4 studies the change in the world return on capital and through it on the welfare of the people who own this capital. Our …nding is that the presence of tax havens a¤ects welfare in the same direction through both channels.
If the factor prices do change, the welfare e¤ect in the corrupt country may arise from the change in investment and the net capital return. As for the non-corrupt country, it may bene…t from an increase in R in the corrupt country only by attracting additional capital so that the results of Slemrod and Wilson hold. Correspondingly, a decrease in R in the corrupt country may act against the welfare gains of the non-corrupt country following eliminating tax havens.
Example
To provide a deeper insight, we present in this subsection an example employing speci…c functional forms and parameter values. The production is characterised by a Cobb-Douglas function: f = k . This yields R = k 1 : Consequently, we obtain expressions for k, ; k 0 (R) ; and ". Further, we calibrate the parameter = where A > 0, and we solve for the optimal g. We calibrate 14 A by assuming that the real net interest rate is 1%. This gives A = 2:7.
Note that B := 1 t (1 s n ) pc = 0:95 to ensure equal gross interest rate across countries. Suppose that the cost function for using tax havens'services is of the form s = 1 exp c a . 12 The parameter a > 0. Higher values of a correspond to high costs of avoidance. A summary of the numerical example is presented in table 2.
Consider a tax haven that provides services to the non-corrupt country but not to the corrupt country. The tax haven serves as a threatening mechanism that forces the corrupt government to keep the bribe rate rather low. This in turn lowers the gross interest rate and enhances investment. In the lowest panel in table 2, we consider completely shutting down the tax haven. As a result, the net interest rate can be altered. In the absence of the tax haven, the following condition holds:
in contrast to a world with a tax haven, where
The results show that the positive e¤ect of the tax haven on investment is weakened by the general-equilibrium e¤ect. The out ‡ow of capital is not as large as in the case of …xed net and gross interest rates in the non-corrupt country. The welfare channel through the provision of public good, however, does not change. In the next subsection, we summarise our results and position our contribution in the literature.
A Summary of Our Welfare Analysis
Is the elimination of tax havens welfare enhancing? Our contribution for answering the above question can be summarised as follows: For a …xed bribe rate, tax havens can have positive e¤ects on welfare by facilitating investment by …rms fearing bribes and expropriation in corrupt countries. However, this e¤ect is weakened by the corrupt government reducing the bribe rate. 13 The net e¤ect depends on the exact functional form of the cost of using tax havens and on the interest elasticity of capital demand.
Welfare e¤ects of tax havens go beyond …rms'operations. Tax havens have negative e¤ects on welfare by facilitating deporting and the concealment of o¢ cials'bribes.
The …nal e¤ects on welfare are illustrated in …gure 1. Under standard preferences, the welfare function is concave in investment and public goods. Even if we assume that investment will always decrease as a result of shutting down tax havens, the net impact on welfare can be positive. Starting from an initial point (a), eliminating tax havens'services will cause either a movement along the welfare curve to the south of (a) or a shift to another welfare curve within the shaded rectangle. The …nal e¤ect will be positive if the new welfare curve is located somewhere within the shaded region determined by the initial welfare curve and the horizontal line through point (a). 
Firm-Level Data
We use the German MiDi …rm-level data on outbound foreign direct investment (FDI). This data set is exceptionally suited for our analysis. In contrast to several other …rm-level data, the MiDi data include the "population" of German …rms investing abroad. The German foreign trade and payments regulation obliges all …rms investing abroad, and satisfying the reporting requirements, to report key information on their a¢ liates abroad. Consequently, we are not greatly concerned about sample selection bias or non-random sampling. The data contain detailed information on the ownership chain. That is, we can observe if the parent …rm indirectly, via another …rm, owns an a¢ liate in a tax haven. The data span from 1996 to 2008 and contain about 23,000 observations a year at the a¢ liate level (about 7000 parent …rms a year).
Econometric Speci…cation
Empirically, welfare and detailed information on tax evasion and corruptionrelated matters are unobservable. However, our data contain parent …rms located in Germany investing via a¢ liates around the world. To map from our theory to the empirics, we note that the maximisation problem of the parent …rm is equivalent to maximising pro…ts separately in the non-corrupted country and in the corrupted country. Our idea is to test the crucial hypothesis directly implied by our theoretical sketch.
Hypothesis 1: The number of …rms using tax havens increases with an increase in bribes b and the expropriation probability .
An increase in bribes and/or the probability of expropriations is in essence an increase in a measure of corruption. For the empirical analysis, Hypothesis 1 can be reformulated as:
The presence of a …rm in a highly corrupt country, as captured by a corruption measure, has a positive e¤ect on the probability of having an a¢ liate in a tax haven.
To test Hypothesis 1', we have to transform the country-speci…c variables associated with a¢ liated …rms to parent-…rm-speci…c variables. Figure 2 illustrates the structure of the data in connection with our application. for this purpose, we exploit the information on the ownership structure and the foreign investment of the parent …rm.
We employ a discrete choice setup:
The dependent variable is de…ned as follows: y k;t = 1 if parent …rm k has an a¢ liate in a tax haven in year t 0 otherwise Table 3 displays a list of tax havens in our data set. The corresponding variable is denoted by y 1 . As emphasised in Hines (2010) , di¤erent lists based on di¤erent criteria share to a very a large extent identical countries. Since Austria might be particularly important for German …rms, for robustness we also de…ne y 2 after excluding Austria from the list of havens.
The variable of interest is hc k;t = 1 if parent …rm k operates in a highly corrupt country in year t 0 otherwise 14 Table 4 displays the countries that satisfy this criterion. We denote the variable based on this list by hc 1 . For robustness, we also de…ne another variable, hc 2 , based on the Freedom from Corruption index of the Heritage Institute.
We employ pooled and also conditional …xed-e¤ects logistic regressions allowing for unobserved heterogeneity at the parent level as captured by k . Additionally, we include year-…xed e¤ects t . We rely on maximum likelihood estimations. Since hc k;t is de…ned as an alternative-speci…c variable, the sign of the estimated coe¢ cient 1 re ‡ects the sign of the e¤ect of hc k;t on y k;t . Our interest is in the qualitative e¤ects rather than the magnitudes of the elasticities.
We control for tax planning activities related to multinational a¢ liates located in high-tax countries by including the following variable in the regressions:
high_taxf irm k;t = 1 if parent …rm k operates in a high-tax country in year t 0 otherwise A country is considered to be a high-tax country if its statutory corporate income tax rate lies in the highest quartile of tax rates in the sample. De facto, Germany exempts foreign income from taxation. Hence, it is particularly attractive to establish an a¢ liate in a tax haven if the parent …rm operates in high-tax country. 15 As further control variables in X, following Desai et al. (2006), we include the size and the square of the size of the …rm as captured by the sum of all revenues from its operations abroad (excluding revenues from a¢ liates located in tax havens). Some theoretical studies suggest that larger …rms are more likely to demand tax havens'services (Krautheim and Schmidt-Eisenlohr; 2011). Table 5 lists the variables used in the regression analysis. 
Empirical Results
Conditional logit estimates rely on time-varying parent-…rm-speci…c variables. However, some …rms do not operate at all in tax havens, while others do operate in tax havens during the entire sample period. Consequently, in order to exploit cross-sectional variation, we present in the …rst four columns of table 6 estimation results from a pooled logit with industry and year …xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors are reported between brackets. The e¤ect of hc1 on the probability of having an a¢ liate located in a tax haven is positive and signi…cant at the 1 percent con…dence level in all speci…cations with and without industry …xed e¤ects. This result supports Hypothesis 1. Column (3) includes also control variables. Firms that operate in high-tax countries are more likely to operate also in tax havens. This is consistent with the notion that multinational …rms use tax haven operations for tax planning purposes, especially under exemption regimes (Gumpert et al., 2011) . Further, we allow for a possible correlation between the size of the …rm and its presence in a corrupt country. The estimated coe¢ cient of the size of the parent …rm, as captured by the log of its total sales around the world excluding revenues from its tax havens, is positive. We include also the square of the size of the …rm. It enters with a signi…cant negative e¤ect. Since the model is not linear, the qualitative interaction e¤ect of the size of the …rm cannot be read directly from those estimates. Elasticities have to be computed for this variable. However, when we include only the size variable without its square, the e¤ect is positive, suggesting that the larger the …rm, the larger the probability of demanding tax havens'services (results are not reported). More importantly, the signi…cance and the sign of the coe¢ cient of hc1 are maintained. Additionally, in column (4), we re-estimate the model but exclude …nancial services …rms from the sample. The results are maintained.
To allow for unobserved heterogeneity at the …rm level, we present in columns (5) to (8) conditional logit estimates with parent …rm …xed e¤ects. This strategy also allows for industry-speci…c variables, since these are nested in the …rm-speci…c e¤ects. Standard errors are clustered at the parent …rm level, allowing the error terms to be correlated within a group. The positive and highly signi…cant estimated coe¢ cient of hc 1 of 1.263 in column (1) also supports Hypothesis 1.
In addition, we include a measure of diversi…cation of parent …rm activities. It also, to some extent, re ‡ects the size of the …rm. The results suggest that it is positively associated with the probability of having an a¢ liate in a tax haven. Furthermore, the estimates indicate that operating in high-tax countries and diversi…cation of the …rm increase the probability of demanding tax havens' services. We obtain similar results in column (8) after we discard …nancial …rms.
For further robustness checks, table 7 provides additional results particularly regarding three aspects: (1) The inclusion of a continuous corruption measure rather than a discrete one. We de…ne "size inv corru" as the logarithm of (1+) the size of …rms'operations in corrupt countries. Our results are maintained in all speci…cations. For instance, in columns (5), (7), and (8), our variable of interest size inv corru is positive and signi…cant together with the other two size variables and the diversi…cation variable. This is reassuring that our results are not driven by a mechanical correlation between the size of the …rm and operating in corrupted countries. Thus, over all, after controlling for operation in high-tax countries, size, and the diversity of the …rm, the estimates are consistent with Hypothesis 1.
Finally, we end this section by stressing the caveat that our theoretical reasoning in the previous sections is not a model of …rms'entry into foreign economies. Empirically, for the purposes of our study, we are essentially interested in establishing a rigorous correlation between operating in corrupt countries and in tax havens after controlling for size and other parent-…rm characteristics. While our conditional logistic regression results suggest a causal relationship, sceptical readers may raise concerns about potential endogeneity in that …rms invest in corrupt countries because they already have a¢ liates in tax havens, and not the other way around. Arguably, however, the cost of establishing a tax haven a¢ liate can be very low, supporting our presentation. For example, Sharman (2010) reports that one can open a bank account in an o¤shore island for "only"800 U.S. dollar. 
Conclusion
Multinational …rms can rely, in the words of Slemrod (2010), on "a mere stroke of the pen" to design and implement their tax and other related strategies. We have developed a theoretical model that links …rms'investment in corrupt countries and their demand for tax havens'services in order to escape higher bribes and expropriation. The model o¤ers an explanation for the need of …rms for tax havens' services even if the statutory tax rate is low. Furthermore, our model has indicated new welfare e¤ects of eliminating tax havens. Tax havens may support investment in corrupt countries, but at the same time they provide a secure shelter for corrupt o¢ cials'earnings. Based on …rm-level data on outbound FDI, we have found empirical support for one hypothesis implied by our model: …rms' investment in highly corrupt countries is associated with a high probability of having a¢ liates in tax havens.
One policy implication of our study is that eliminating tax havens' operations must be considered from a global perspective. Tax havens in our model could ‡ourish even if they were to stop providing services to …rms in highly advanced ("non-corrupt") economies. A treaty or an arrangement that does not consider also developing and resource-rich countries may not be e¤ective. Our theoretical model is static. A dynamic approach may reveal further welfare e¤ects of shutting down tax havens by modelling the transition from a corrupt country to a non-corrupt country. While a tax haven can support investment (and corruption) in corrupt countries in view of their weak institutional setup, eradicating corruption can substantially enhance foreign direct investment. Such a framework can be a fruitful topic for future research. 
Optimal Bribes with Pervasive Havens
From the optimality condition (7) with = g = 0 and = 1; d db = 0. We write:
We implicitly di¤erentiate (9) and apply the envelope theorem to obtain:
Since pro…ts of the …rms cannot go up as a result of an increase in bribes, the right-hand side of the above expression is positive. Since the left-hand side is positive as well, it must be that dR db > 0.
Plugging this into (18a), we get: s 00 > 0 (correspondingly, (1 s) s 00 + s 02 < 0). Otherwise, the equality does not hold because dR db > 0 and " > 1. Simplifying with the use of FOC s 0b = p, we get the expression (10).
Deriving Condition (11)
Start from a situation without a tax haven. The optimal bribe rate is just the inverse of capital demand elasticity,b = 1 "
. Next, introduce a tax haven. Without the reaction of the corrupt government, …rms will increase their pro…t from 1 pc R. Naturally, the investment will then increase, driving the interest rate down to match the world net interest rate r. Faced with this higher capital, the government will want to raise the bribe rate, if d hb (1 s) Rk i =dbjb =1=" > 0; that is, the government revenue increases. The total e¤ect of the bribe can be decompose into 3 e¤ects: (1) The direct positive e¤ect (1 s) Rk, (2) the negative e¤ect of inducing avoidance b Rk 
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The condition for an increase in the bribe rate is all evaluated atb = 1=". Plug and into the previous expression to obtain the condition for an increase in the bribe rate in the presence of the tax haven: + < 1:
Proof of Proposition 2
With = g = 0, consider a change in bribe rate that preserves the gross interest rate and hence investment. From (8) and (9) we getb nh =b h (1 s c )+ pc. The havens allocation is feasible, when no haven is available. Then the statement of the proposition follows by revealed preference argument with the government being strictly better o¤ wheneverbs c > pc.
Proof of Proposition 3
Since g 0 is assumed to be su¢ ciently small (in fact, it can be normalised to zero), we have g > g 0 . At the same time, R and k are the same regardless of whether is exogenous or not. Since the utility u(x; g) is increasing in g, the utility is higher with endogenous probability if there were no havens; in the case with pervasive havens, it is the same, whether the probability is exogenous or endogenous.
Proof of Proposition 4
The result for the non-corrupt country is proven in Slemrod and Wilson (2009) . Regarding the corrupt country, introducing the tax haven puts downward pressure on R. In order to keep R unchanged, r has to increase as described in Proposition 1. Then we have r nh < r h ) x nh < x h and u(x nh ; g 0 ) < u(x h ; g 0 ).
